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Japan� In a campaign breathtaking in 
its brutality, Japan destroyed China’s 
nascent republic, enabled the victory 
of the Communists in their civil war 
with the Nationalists, and destroyed 
the old imperial order in Asia� Thus, 
the new China was born into a world 
of many possibilities� Unhappily, none 
of the good ones, either domesti-
cally or internationally, was realized 
until 1979, when China’s current 
“rise” can be said to have begun� 
Westad’s fine account of what has come 
before brings us to realize that the rise of 
China will not necessarily have a calm-
ing effect on either the Chinese people 
or on others who live nearby� Since 1750, 
“internationalization,” though not en-
tirely a one-way street, has been mostly 
that; now, the restless empire, once in a 
defensive crouch, is moving out smartly 
in all directions� Perhaps this should be 
expected of a “civilizational state,” except 
that today’s China offers to the world 
nothing of what it once did—no high 
culture, no attainments in intellectual 
and philosophical life, and certainly no 
models for wise and effective gover-
nance� Instead, as Westad helps us see, 
the current regime is thrashing around, 
which makes its own future, as well as 
the futures both of its “near abroad” and 
of the world at large, hard to predict� 
Empires, we have been taught, are sup-
posed to bring peace, but today’s Middle 
Empire ruled from today’s Beijing 
displays many indications that it is bent 
on becoming a major disturber of the 
peace� Yet even under a more enlight-
ened outlook, there would be chal-
lenges: the Middle Empire borders on 
three nuclear-weapons states—Russia, 
India, and Pakistan—and probably also 
a fourth, North Korea� Even so, from 
his own well-informed examination of 
China’s modern experience Westad con-
cludes that prospects for peace remain—
not a ringing vote of confidence in the 
powers that be in Beijing, but neither is 
it a wholly despairing outlook� After all, 
Westad is an accomplished historian of 
the Cold War, the nonviolent, freedom-
enhancing outcome of which reminds us 
that things do not always turn out badly�
CHARLES HORNER
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute 
Washington, D.C.
Twomey, Christopher P� The Military Lens: Doc-
trinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-
American Relations� Ithaca, N�Y�: Cornell Univ� 
Press, 2010� 240pp� $35
It has been said that “weapons speak 
to the wise—but in general they need 
interpreters�” The Military Lens, writ-
ten by political scientist Christopher P� 
Twomey, associate professor at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, in Monterey, Cali-
fornia, shows the difficulty of that quote� 
Twomey makes a strong case that dif-
fering military languages and doctrines 
explain otherwise puzzling examples 
of deterrence failure and escalation�
The Military Lens is a welcome addition 
to the literature on deterrence, which 
too often treats actors as interchange-
able “black boxes�” Twomey writes in the 
spirit of authors who, like Robert Jervis, 
explore psychological factors that led to 
misinterpreting the actions of others� 
Twomey’s work adds the new factor of 
military doctrine� Every military has 
its own doctrine, or “theory of victory,” 
its vision of how military resources 
are to be used to achieve operational 
success� Twomey’s core argument is 
that strategists look through a doctri-
nal “lens” when assessing capabilities 
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and intentions and that this weakens 
deterrence in two ways: the credibility 
of others’ threats is discounted, because 
their doctrines are thought to be ineffec-
tive, and the others’ signals are missed 
by the use of one’s own doctrine as a 
template for indicators� This attention to 
misperceptions at the level of operation-
al net assessment is new and of direct 
relevance to planners and analysts�
Much of the book tests the author’s 
theory against three Korean War–era 
episodes: China’s failure to deter U�S� 
movement north of the thirty-eighth 
parallel, American failure to deter China 
from entering the war, and the less well-
known maritime story of how the United 
States prevented a planned Chinese inva-
sion of Taiwan� Twomey also traces how 
greatly the United States and the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) underestimated 
each other’s land warfare capabilities 
and as a result issued threats that neither 
considered credible� The PLA Navy, 
with officers largely educated abroad, 
understood that U�S� air supremacy ren-
dered landings impossible� The choice 
of the 1950 Korean cases was wise, as 
most variables other than PLA army/
navy differences are constant� A notable 
feature of the case studies is archival 
research, both in the United States and 
in China; fresh documentation alone 
will appeal to Korean War specialists�
Doctrinal difference fits the Korean 
War, but the radical divergence of the 
revolutionary PLA and atomic American 
military makes this a relatively easy case, 
as Twomey acknowledges� How often 
do doctrinal differences generally lead 
to deterrence failures? An additional 
chapter on two Arab-Israeli cases argues 
that deterrence failure is correlated with 
doctrinal divergence� The evidence 
is suggestive, but the book could be 
strengthened by a larger universe of  
cases that may answer such additional 
questions as these: Are doctrinal dif-
ferences more common in ground 
than naval warfare, for example? Do 
opponents in long-lasting rivalries 
(compared to the United States / 
People’s Republic of China in 1950) 
fare better at assessing the others’ 
capability despite differing doctrines? 
The Military Lens offers a warning that 
clear, credible threats may not be under-
stood as such by others� Since doctrinal 
misperceptions take place at the military 
level, the lessons here are particularly 
relevant to planners, as they develop 
assessments and deterrent options for 
civilian leaders� This work also holds 
implications for professional military 
education, stating as it does that officers 
should be encouraged to overcome doc-
trinal filters, that scholars should study 
foreign doctrines, and that educational 
exchanges might reduce misunderstand-
ings (the author himself is involved 
in U�S�-Chinese dialogues)� Perhaps 
weapons speak a common tongue, but 
Twomey reminds us that militaries need 
to be fluent in multiple languages� 
DAVID BURBACH
Naval War College 
Kane, Tim� Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Military 
Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It’s Time for 
a Revolution� New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012� 271pp� $27
This book provides a critical analysis 
and highlights a dysfunctional U�S� 
Army officer personnel management 
system� The author explains why the 
best and brightest young officers depart 
early for civilian careers and what can be 
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